ICJ: Two Advisory Opinions on Racial Discrimination and Autonomous Weapons

Body: International Court of Justice
Bench: President Ikanke Jimmy; Vice-President Opeoluwa Ogunyemi; Judges Lotanna Anyigbo-Dike, Olaifa Temidara Jewel, Nwankwo Chiemela, Oseaga Ehi-Uwaifoh, Eniola Orepitan, Kanyinsola Iyiola, Oluwaferanmi Ayegbusi, Mercy Olatoye, Okoli Olivia Chimamanda, Ukpe Nsikan Eseose, Elisha Ebunoluwa Okoh, Oyindamola Fadhilah Hassan, Idowu Promise Olasunkanmi, Mustapha Promise Onimisi

Opinion I — State Obligations Under CERD Following the Depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh

Proceedings instituted by: Armenia, against Azerbaijan
Oral arguments heard: 4 August 2026
Appearances: Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan presented. Both filed pleadings, which the Court considered. The Court received representation from the Russian Federation and the State of Israel as uninterested parties.

Questions identified by the Court

Whether Armenia bears obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination towards Azerbaijan in respect of conduct after its accession on 23 June 1993; whether alleged policies and practices demonstrate an intention to discriminate against or ethnically cleanse Azerbaijanis within the meaning of the Convention; whether Armenia bears responsibility for sponsoring, supporting or failing to suppress organisations alleged to have engaged in racial discrimination, including the organisation known as VOMA; whether the acts alleged fall within the definition of racial discrimination in Article 1(1); and whether the conduct is governed exclusively by international humanitarian law or may simultaneously engage Convention obligations.

Opinion of the Court

Armenia's obligations arose on accession in June 1993. Consistent with Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention does not apply retroactively, and only conduct occurring after accession is capable of engaging responsibility.

Where evidence establishes the systematic displacement of Azerbaijani populations, the prevention of their voluntary return, and the deliberate alteration of the demographic composition of affected territories on ethnic grounds, such conduct may fall within Article 1(1) as racial discrimination. Whether it also amounts to ethnic cleansing is to be assessed on the evidence in each case.

On VOMA, the Court found it could not conclude on the material before it that Armenia exercised the degree of control necessary to attribute the organisation's conduct directly to the state. It held, however, that a state's failure to take reasonable measures to prevent or suppress discriminatory conduct, where it had knowledge and the capacity to act, may itself constitute a violation of Article 2(1)(d).

The Court rejected the contention that the existence of an armed conflict automatically displaces the Convention. International humanitarian law and international human rights law are complementary regimes that may apply concurrently, and conduct during armed conflict may engage obligations under both.

The Court concluded by observing that the Convention provides an important framework for addressing racial discrimination but is not sufficient in itself to resolve a dispute whose origins are also historical, political, territorial and security-related, and that lasting resolution requires sustained diplomatic engagement and negotiated settlement.

Questions to the participating delegations

Under Article 61 of the Rules of Court, the bench questioned Russia and Israel during oral proceedings.

Russia attributed its opposition to certain Western-led initiatives to their association with NATO, an alliance established in opposition to the Soviet Union. Asked whether it regarded the 2023 displacement of approximately 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh as ethnic cleansing, Russia said it did not. Asked whether it had taken reasonable steps to facilitate a peaceful settlement, Russia answered in the affirmative.

Israel confirmed its recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan's sovereign territory, and reaffirmed that position when asked whether it was altered by Armenia's historical, ethnic and indigenous claims. Asked whether Article 1 of the Convention applies independently of the existence of armed conflict, the delegate indicated Israel did not consider it to extend in the manner suggested. Asked to reconcile its position with Israel's own historical experience of territorial disputes involving competing historical and ethnic claims, the delegate declined to answer. Asked whether Armenia could incur responsibility for conduct before its accession, the delegate declined to answer.

The Court referred to publicly available data indicating Israel accounted for approximately 69 per cent of Azerbaijan's major arms imports between 2016 and 2020, and asked whether such cooperation was consistent with its assertion that it represented neither party. The delegate explained that Israel maintains bilateral relations with Azerbaijan based on strategic, economic and energy interests, and engages in defence cooperation with numerous states.

Both Russia and Israel declined to respond when asked why they had not exercised their influence to encourage compliance with the Court's provisional measures concerning the Lachin Corridor.

Opinion II — Legality of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Under International Humanitarian Law

Requested by: the General Assembly, 3 August 2026
Delivered: 4 August 2026

Questions posed

Whether member states should be permitted to deploy lethal autonomous weapons systems in armed conflict; whether there should be a requirement of meaningful human control in their deployment and what standard should apply; and how individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility should be allocated where deployment gives rise to non-compliance with humanitarian law.

Opinion of the Court

The Court advised that a legally binding international instrument should be adopted under the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to regulate the development, deployment and use of such systems.

It held that deployment and use must remain subject to meaningful human control, and that decisions involving the use of lethal force must not be delegated entirely to autonomous systems. Human judgment must remain integral to decision-making to ensure compliance with humanitarian law, protect civilian populations and preserve accountability throughout the chain of command.

Legal responsibility for unlawful deployment or use remains with the state and, where applicable, with military commanders and other responsible natural persons. It cannot be transferred to or displaced by autonomous technologies.

Standard of meaningful human control

The Court set out three minimum elements. Manual override capability: a reliable mechanism allowing authorised operators to suspend, modify or terminate operation at any stage of deployment. Continuous human supervision: a designated operator or command authority monitoring operation throughout deployment, retaining the practical ability to intervene where conduct departs from humanitarian law. Mandatory deactivation and demilitarisation: an obligation on states to permanently deactivate and dismantle systems that have demonstrated instability, malfunction, or an inability to comply with humanitarian law.

Reasoning

The Court examined the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution under Articles 48, 51(5)(b) and 57 of Additional Protocol I, and considered that, subject to an adequate legal and operational framework, the use of such systems is not inherently incompatible with them. It held that the Article 57 obligation to take all feasible precautions cannot be fully satisfied where systems operate without sufficient human oversight, human judgment remaining indispensable where unforeseen battlefield conditions require deviation from a programmed course of action.

On accountability, the Court observed that autonomous systems are not legal persons and cannot bear rights or obligations. Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute limits jurisdiction to natural persons, and Article 30 requires intent and knowledge — mental elements autonomous systems cannot possess. Wrongful acts therefore remain attributable to states under Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Individual criminal responsibility may arise under Articles 25, 28 and 30 of the Rome Statute, and Article 8(2)(b)(iv) criminalises attacks launched in the knowledge of clearly excessive incidental civilian loss.

The Court noted that liability may in appropriate circumstances extend to individuals involved in the design, programming or deployment of such systems where they intentionally contributed to international crimes or knowingly facilitated unlawful conduct. It emphasised the importance of pre-deployment legal review under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, and the guidance of the Group of Governmental Experts under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

The Court concluded that liability must be determined case by case, and that the emergence of autonomous weapon systems does not create a legal vacuum — existing principles of international law continue to govern their development, deployment and use.